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This paper analyzes the economic and environmental 
consequences of a potential demand side management 
program in Thailand using a general equilibrium model. 
The program considers replacement of less efficient 
electrical appliances in the household sector with more 
efficient counterparts. The study further examines 
changes in the economic and environmental effects 
of the program if it is implemented under the clean 
development mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol, which 
provides carbon subsidies to the program. The study 
finds that the demand side management program would 
increase economic welfare if the ratio of unit cost of 
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electricity savings to price of electricity is 0.4 or lower 
even in the absence of the clean development mechanism. 
If the program’s ratio of unit cost of electricity savings 
to price of electricity is greater than 0.4, registration of 
the program under the clean development mechanism 
would be needed to achieve positive welfare impacts. The 
level of welfare impacts would, however, depend on the 
price of carbon credits the program generates. For a given 
level of welfare impacts, the registration of the demand 
side management program under the clean development 
mechanism would increase the volume of emission 
reductions.  
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The energy crises of the 1970s and high energy prices accompanied with high 
inflation and interest rates led to energy conservation or demand side management (DSM) 
programs all over the world (Gellings 2000). Electric utilities in the US and European 
countries launched DSM programs in the 1980s. In the United States, about US$23 billion 
was invested for DSM programs between 1989 and 1999 (Laughran and Kulick, 2004). 
Growing environmental concerns, particularly over the increasing emissions of air pollutants 
from energy production and consumption activities, further encouraged DSM programs 
(Wirl, 2000). In Asia, DSM programs were started in the early nineties. In Thailand, the 
Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) implemented a five-year DSM 
program during 1993-1998, which resulted in reductions of 468MW of peak demand, 
2,194GWh of electricity generation and 1.64 million tons of CO2 emission (EGAT, 2000). 
 
There exists a large potential for reducing energy consumption as well as 
environmental emissions from various DSM programs, including energy efficient lighting, 
refrigeration and air-conditioning, and energy efficient motors and other electrical appliances 
in developing countries (DC) in Asia (See e.g., ALGAS, 1999b; Shrestha et al, 1998a,b). 
According to ALGAS, 1999b, implementation of DSM programs in eight Asian countries 
(i.e., China, Myanmar, Mongolia, Pakistan, Philippines, South Korea, Thailand and Vietnam) 
could reduce 17.4 billion tons of CO2 emission during 2000-2020 period with net economic 
benefits in addition to the climate change benefits. In Thailand alone, DSM programs have 
the potential to mitigate 142 million tons of CO2, during the 2000-2020 period with net 
economic benefits (ALGAS, 1999a). Despite the large potential of GHG mitigation and other 
environmental and economic benefits, DSM programs are not being implemented in many 
DCs due to the lack of financial resources. 
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 Using partial equilibrium analysis
1, existing studies, such as Shrestha et al. (1998a, 
b), Schipper and Meyers (1991), Hsueh and Grener (1993), find DSM activities economically 
attractive
2. On the other hand, studies, such as Dufournaud et al. (1994) and Rose and Lin 
(1995) argue that DSM options, which are economically attractive from a partial equilibrium 
approach, may not necessarily be attractive if they are examined using general equilibrium 
models
3. A question may, however, arise: would all DSM options, no matter how 
economically attractive they are in a partial equilibrium setting, lead to negative welfare 
effects in a general equilibrium setting? Would DSM programs with highly attractive internal 
rate of returns (IRR) be still welfare regressive if their economy wide impacts are 
considered? This question is a crucial one for countries which are implementing DSM 
programs (e.g., Thailand). Moreover, even if DSM programs are found welfare regressive 
from a general equilibrium perspective; are there ways to offset these negative impacts? The 
clean development mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol could be an instrument to 
resolve this issue because the CDM not only enhances the economic attractiveness of a DSM 
program, but also helps reduce financial barriers to DSM programs. By the end of December 
2007, 52 energy efficiency projects have already been registered by the Executive Board of 
the CDM (CDMEB) and more than 250 similar projects are in pipeline (UNEP RISØ Centre, 
2007; UNFCCC, 2007). 
 
In this paper, we examine the welfare effects of a potential DSM program in 
Thailand, under which existing less efficient electrical appliances in the household sector are 
replaced with their efficient counterparts, by using a general equilibrium model. We first 
assess the welfare impacts if the DSM program is implemented in the absence of a CDM 
                                                           
1 A partial equilibrium analysis accounts for only direct costs and benefits of a project or a program in 
consideration, it does not account the indirect costs and benefits that would incur due to linkages between 
various agents of the economy (e.g., industry, household, government, international trade). Thus, it can not 
estimate the economy-wide impacts of the project or program (e.g., impacts on economic welfare, GDP, trade 
balance). 
2 Note also that economic analyses of DSM programs often neglect social benefits of reducing environmental 
pollutants (e.g., oxides of sulfur, oxides of nitrogen, suspended particulate matters, volatile organic compounds, 
etc.). If such benefits are quantified and accounted for, DSM programs would be further attractive. 
3  A general equilibrium model accounts for all direct and indirect impacts of an activity to an economy. 
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 scheme. This will be followed by an analysis of the roles for CDM to improve the welfare 
effects of the DSM program. We show that not all DSM options are welfare regressive. It 
depends on three factors: (i) the ratio of unit cost of electricity savings to price of electricity 
(CPR), (ii) price of certified emission reductions (CERs), and (iii) rate of substitution of less 
efficient appliances with their efficient counterparts. We find that the DSM program would 
result in positive welfare impacts as long as the CPR is smaller than 0.4 (or IRR > 23%) even 
in the absence of CDM. Implementation of the DSM program under the CDM would result in 
positive welfare effects when CPR is higher than 0.4 (or IRR < 23%) depending on the price 
of CERs.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly presents the general equilibrium 
model developed for the purpose of the study and the source of the data. Section 3 discusses 
results from model simulations (i.e., the economic welfare and environmental impacts of the 
DSM program), followed by sensitivity analyses of key parameters. Finally, the major 
conclusions of the paper are summarized. 
 
2. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE CGE MODEL  
 
A static general equilibrium model has been developed for the purpose of this study. 
In this section, we briefly present approaches to modeling various economic agents (e.g., 
producers, households, the government and the foreign sector)
4. 
 
2.1 The production sector 
 
The study considers 21 production sectors (see Table 1), of which seven produce 
energy goods and services, and the rest material goods and services. The production behavior 
of each sector is represented through a four level nested structure (see Figure 1a and 1b). In 
each sector, gross output (XD) is a nested function of capital (K), labor (L), material (Gk), 
fossil fuel (Gf) and electricity (GEL):  
                                                           
4 Not all equations of the model are presented here. Please see Timilsina (2007) for more detailed descriptions 
of the model.  
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 XD K L), G G G G G k fE L = β θ ϕ γ ν φ [( , {( , . . , ) ,(( , . . , ) , ) } ] 11      (1) 
where θ is the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) composite of primary factors; ϕ is the 
CES composite of the material aggregate (γ) and the composite of the fuel aggregate (φ) and 
electricity (ν). φ is the CES aggregate of fossil fuels and γ is the Cobb-Douglas aggregate of 
materials. The CES functional form of XD can be written as follows: 




σσσ σ σ 11 11− 1         ( 2 )  
where λ is the share parameter and σ is the elasticity of substitution between θ and ϕ. Similar 
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where xdp is the output price, and pθ and pϕ are prices of θ and ϕ respectively. xdp is derived 
from a cost function, which is dual to the production function in Equation (2) and is given as: 
xdp p p =+
− −− [
() () / ( λλ θθ
σ
ϕϕ
σ 1 11 1 ] ) σ           ( 5 )  
 
Table 1: Economics Sectors and Electricity Sub-sectors Considered in the Model 
   
(a)Economic Sectors, Goods and Services  
Non-Energy Sector and Good  Energy Sector and Good 
1. Agriculture & Forestry  1. Fuel Wood 
2. Construction  2. Coal  
3. Mining (Except Energy)  3. Crude Oil  
4. Food and Beverage  4. Petroleum Products 
5. Textile and Apparel  5. Natural Gas 
6. Pulp and Paper  6. Electricity 
7.Chemicals & Fertilizers   
8.Non-Metallic Minerals   
9. Primary Metals   
10. Fabricated Metals   
11.Electrical Machinery   
12.Other Manufacturing   
13. Commercial Services   
14. Transportation Services   
15.Other Services   
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 (b)   Electricity Sub-Sector or Technology  
Primary Electricity  Secondary or Thermal Electricity 




  Coal   Oil  Oil  
  Oil   Natural Gas   
 Natural  Gas     
All other demand variables, as indicated in Figure 1a, are determined in a similar 
manner to Equations (3) and (4), while the price variables are determined in a similar manner 
to Equation (5). 
 
Figure 1:  Nested Structure of the Production Sectors 
γ =CD(G1,..,Gk) ν =CES(φ, GEL)
φ =CES(G1,..,Gf) GEL
θ = CES(K,L) ϕ =CES(γ, ν)
XD=CES(θ,ϕ)
γ =CD(G1,..,Gk)
μ =CES(γ, GEL) φ =CES(G1,..,Gf) K







Gf G1 G1 Gk
γ =CD(G1,..,Gk) ν =CES(φ, GEL)
φ =CES(G1,..,Gf) GEL
θ = CES(K,L) ϕ =CES(γ, ν)
XD=CES(θ,ϕ)
γ =CD(G1,..,Gk)
μ =CES(γ, GEL) φ =CES(G1,..,Gf) K







Gf G1 G1 Gk
 
(a) Sectors except electricity generation        (b) Electricity generation sector 
One of the key features of the model is that it treats the electrical sector in a different 
manner than most existing studies. First, the electricity sector is divided into seven sub-
sectors based on technologies used for electricity generation (see Table 1b)
5. This allows the 
substitution possibilities between various technologies used for electricity generation. 
Secondly the nested CES structure used for the electricity sector differs from those used in 
the rest of the sectors to allow direct substitution between capital and fuel in the electricity 
generation industries. It is very important to treat the electricity sector with special attention 
                                                           
5  Some studies such as Brown et al. (1999) also consider different technologies to generate electricity while 
modeling the electricity sector in GTEM model. 
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 in GE models for environmental policy analysis in countries where electricity generation 
based on fossil fuels is one of the main sources of GHG emissions. The gross output of the 
electricity industry g is given as: 
XD K G G L, G G G g g g gf g gk gE L = β ω φ χ μ γ [ { , ( ,.., )}, { ( ( ,.., ), )}] ,, ,, , 11     (6) 
where ω is the composite of capital and the fuel aggregate used in electricity industry g and χ 
is the composite of labor and the material-electricity composite (μ). The demand and price 
variables in the case of the electricity industries are determined in a similar manner to the 
other sectors discussed above. Electricity generated with different types of technologies is 
aggregated as shown in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2:  Aggregation of Electricity Outputs Produced by Different Electricity Generation 
Technologies
XDSTG
υ= CES (XDSTC, XDSTO, XDSTG)
XDHY κ=CES (υ, Ω, XDIC)
XDEL=CES (XDHY, κ) Tier- 1
Tier- 2
Tier- 3 Ω=CES (XDCGO, XDCGG)
XDSTC
XDIC
XDSTO XDCGO XDCGG XDSTG
υ= CES (XDSTC, XDSTO, XDSTG)
XDHY κ=CES (υ, Ω, XDIC)
XDEL=CES (XDHY, κ) Tier- 1
Tier- 2
Tier- 3 Ω=CES (XDCGO, XDCGG)
XDSTC
XDIC
XDSTO XDCGO XDCGG  
 
 
As can be seen from Figure 2, the total electricity output (XDEL) can be expressed as: 
XD XD XD XD XD XD XD XD EL STC STO STG CGO CGG IC HY =Λ Ω [{( , ) , ( , ) , } , ] ,    (7)  κ υ
where Λ is the CES composite of the outputs of the hydropower industry (XDHY) and the 
thermal power industry (κ).  κ is the CES aggregate of the outputs of the steam turbine 
electricity industry (υ), the combined cycle/gas turbine electricity industry (Ω) and the 
internal combustion electricity industry (XDIC). υ is the CES aggregate of the outputs of the 
coal fired steam turbine electricity industry (XDSTC), the oil fired steam turbine electricity 
industry (XDSTO) and the gas fired steam turbine electricity industry (XDSTG), while Ω is the 
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 CES composite of the outputs of the oil fired combined cycle/gas turbine electricity industry 
(XDCGO) and the gas fired combined cycle/gas turbine electricity industry (XDCGG). 
 
The demand for electricity generated from various types of technologies as well as 
the demand for primary factors, energy, and material inputs are derived as discussed in other 








          ( 8 )  
p p p xdp
TH TH TH TH
IC IC κυ υ
σ σσ σ λλλ =+ + − −− − [ () () () /( ) 1 11 11
ΩΩ ]
                                                          
      ( 9 )  
where pκ is the aggregate of unit costs of electricity generation from steam turbine (pυ), 
combined cycle/gas turbine (pΩ) and internal combustion technologies (xdpIC). σ
HYTH is the 
elasticity of substitution between electricity generated from hydro and thermal power plants, 
and σ
TH is the elasticity of substitution between electricity generated from steam turbine, 
combined cycle/gas turbine and internal combustion technologies. 
 
2.2. The household sector 
 
2.2.1. Household demand 
This study considers a representative household that follows a five-step hierarchical 
optimization process to maximize its utility as shown in Figure 3. At the left hand side of the 
bottom of the nested structure (i.e., Tier 5 in Figure 3), household consumption of electricity 
(CHEL) and electrical appliances (CHDG) are combined through a Cobb-Douglas function to 
get electrical services for the households (η)
6. At the right hand side of the same tier, a fuel 
aggregate (φ) is obtained through a CES aggregation of different fuels, such as coal, oil, gas 
and fuelwood. The aggregate energy service (ν) in the household sector is derived through a 
CES combination of the electrical services and the aggregate fuel consumption (φ) (please 
 
6  A sensitivity analysis is also presented later (Section 5), considering an alternative functional form (i.e., CES) 
to combine consumption of electricity and electrical appliances in the household sector. 
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 see left part of Tier 4). In the right hand part of Tier 4, a material aggregate (γ) is derived 
from the Cobb-Douglas aggregation of different materials. The energy-material composite 
(ϕ) is combined with leisure (LS) to give the present consumption (ζ) at the second tier of the 
nested structure. Finally, at the top most tier of the nested structure, households trade off 
between present consumption and savings (S) while maximizing their utility. The household 
utility function is expressed as follows
7:  
UC H C H C H C H C H C H EL DG f L S S k =ψ ς ϕ ν η φ γ [ { ( ( ( , ), ( ,.., )), ( ,.., )), }, ] 11    (10) 
 
Figure 3:  Nested Structure for the Household Sector to Model the DSM Option 
 
γ =CD (CH1, …CHk)
ϕ =CES (ν,γ)
φ =CES (CH1, …CHf) η=CD(CHEL, CHDG)
S ζ=CES (ϕ, LS)





ν =CES (η ,φ)
Tier 5
CHEL CHDG CH1 CHf …..
γ =CD (CH1, …CHk)
ϕ =CES (ν,γ)
φ =CES (CH1, …CHf) η=CD(CHEL, CHDG)
S ζ=CES (ϕ, LS)





ν =CES (η ,φ)
Tier 5
CHEL CHDG CH1 CHf …..  
 
 
The CES functional form for U is given as follows
8: 
                                                           
7 A similar approach has been used in a number of existing general equilibrium models (e.g., Jorgenson and 
Wilcoxen 1993; Bohringer and Rutherford 1997; Shoven and Whalley 1992 and Ballard et al. 1985). 
 
8 The difference in household utilities between the base and counterfactual simulations is used as the measure of 
the change in economic welfare in this study. 
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 US
HH H HH H H H
=+ − −− − [. () . ] / ( )/ / ( )/ /( ) ας α σσ σ σσ σ σ σ 11 11 1 1
S p S
ς ς      ( 1 1 )  
where  αζ is the scaling factor and σ
H is the elasticity of substitution between present 
consumption and household savings. ζ and S are derived from the first order condition of 
maximizing utility under budget constraint, Ip = ς + ς . . , as follows:  
ςα
ς ς
σ = .( . ) Ip Z
H
 (12)    and      SI p S
H
Z . ( . ) ς
σ
                                                          
   (13)  =− () 1 α
with Z p p
HH




σ .( ) . 11 1 
where pζ and pS are prices of present consumption and savings. I is the full income of 
households. In the same manner, other demand and price variables in the household model 
are derived through the different levels of the nested structure shown in Figure 3.  
 
2.2.2. Incorporation of the DSM into the model 
The DSM program is incorporated into the model while modeling household 
behavior. This is because the DSM program considered here refers to electrical appliances in 
the household sector. It is also possible to include electrical appliances in other sectors, such 
as manufacturing and service sectors. This could be a further expansion of the study because 




Modeling demand side options in a general equilibrium framework is often 
constrained by data limitations. For example, an analysis of the substitution of incandescent 
lamps by compact fluorescent lamps would require detailed information on the industries 
producing these appliances (e.g., labor, capital and material inputs). In other words, we need 
an input-output table (I/O table) that treats the lamp industry as a separate sector. However, 
in the existing I/O tables of Thailand, information is available only at an aggregated electrical 
appliances/machinery industry level. Because of this limitation, we incorporate the DSM 
 
9 While most of the electricity demand in the manufacturing sector is for motive power (i.e., electrical motors), 
household demands for electricity is for lighting, air-conditioning and refrigeration etc. 
  10 
 
 options in our model by assuming an aggregate end-use appliance instead of individual 
appliances. 
 
This approach now looks more relevant as the CDM Executive Board has developed, 
in its 28
th meeting, guidance on the registration of a program of activities as a single CDM 
project activity (CDM EB, Dec. 2006). According to the guidance, a number of GHG 
mitigation activities, such as efficient lighting, refrigeration, air-conditioning, energy 
efficient electric motors, etc., can be packaged and registered as a single CDM project. In 
other word, the DSM program such as the one considered in this study can now be registered 
as a single CDM project. 
 
Efficient appliances have relatively higher capital costs than their inefficient 
counterparts. On the other hand, efficient appliances use less electricity than their inefficient 
counterparts, leading to savings in fuel costs. In the general equilibrium modeling context, 
this implies a substitution of electricity costs with the capital costs. The increased use of 
efficient electrical appliances reflects a situation where households allocate higher 
expenditure on appliances (i.e., purchase efficient appliances) and less expenditure on 
electricity. It is assumed that the use of efficient electrical appliances provides at least the 
same level of end use energy services (e.g., lighting) as before (i.e., prior to replacement of 
the inefficient appliances). 
 
The incorporation of the DSM aspect in the CGE model can be described with the 
help of Figure 3. As illustrated in the figure (bottom tier in the left hand side of the nested 
structure), electricity (CHEL) and electrical appliances (CHDG) are combined through a Cobb-
Douglas function to get electrical services (e.g., heat, air-conditioning, light), η, for the 
households. The household maximizes its utility from the use of the electrical services 
subject to the budget constraint: 
Max             ( 1 4 )  
α α η
− =
1 . DG EL CH CH
s.t. 
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In the case of the CES functional form, the utility function to maximize is expressed as:  
Max      (16)  ) 1 /( / ) 1 (
DG
/ 1 / ) 1 (
EL
/ 1 ] CH . ) 1 ( CH . [ − σ σ σ − σ σ σ − σ σ α − + α = η
 
The constraint is the same as in Equation (15). Here, α is the share of electricity in the total 
expenditure on electrical services (i.e., sum of expenditure on electricity and electrical 
appliances). CHf is the household consumption of other fuels (e.g., natural gas, fuel wood, 
petroleum products); CHk is the household consumption of goods and services except 
electrical appliances (e.g., food and beverage, health care, education); gpEL, gpf, gpDG, and 
gpk are the prices of electricity, other fuels, electrical appliances and other goods and 
services, respectively; indtEL, indtf, indtDG, and indtk are the corresponding indirect tax rates. 
DI is disposable income; it also includes revenue generated from exports of CERs. 
 
As we mentioned earlier, an improvement in the end-use energy efficiency of 
electrical appliances implies that households derive at least the same level of electrical 
services as before, using smaller amount of electricity. This aspect of energy efficiency is 
incorporated into the model through the addition of the following constraint: 
0 η η =              ( 1 7 )  
where η
0 is the electrical services that the household is deriving in the base case (i.e., before 
implementation of the DSM program). Equation (17) implies:  
) 1 ( 0 0 ) 1 ( . .





DG are household consumption of electricity and electrical appliances 
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 θ is the policy variable here and exogenous to the model. It represents the rate of replacement 
of inefficient appliances with their efficient counterparts. In the base run, θ has a value of 1. 
In policy simulation runs (counterfactual runs), θ is assigned to different values. For 
example, if θ is equal to 1.25, it can be interpreted as households spending 25% more to buy 
efficient appliances than in the base case. Increasing the consumption of electrical appliances 
would cause a reduction of electricity consumption for deriving the same level of electricity 










CH             ( 2 1 )  
The rate of replacement also represents the level of emission reductions; a low rate of 
replacement would generate small amounts of emission reduction and vice versa. 
 
Our model is a single year static model, but the DSM program generates costs and 
benefits for multiple years. In order to deal with this situation, we calculate annuity of the 
total investment over the economic life of the DSM program. The annuity is compared with 
the annual electricity savings in the absence of CDM, and with the sum of annual electricity 
savings and annual CDM revenue when the DSM program is considered under the CDM. 
Alternatively, we start with an exogenous unit cost of energy savings, which is equal to the 
total costs of the DSM program divided by electricity savings throughout the economic life 
of the program. We then divide the unit cost of electricity savings by an average electricity 
price to get a ratio of unit cost of energy savings to electricity price (CPR). If the CPR is 
smaller than 1, the DSM program will have net savings. The smaller the value of CPR, the 
higher will be IRR of the DSM program. Thus, the model fully accounts for the overall costs 
and benefits of the DSM program. The net savings of the DSM program (DSMSAV) is 
calculated as follows: 
) 1 ).( (
0 CPR CH CH DSMSAV EL EL − − =          ( 2 2 )  
 
The economics of a DSM project is sensitive to two factors: (i) cost of its implementation 
and (ii) price of electricity, which is used to estimate DSM benefits. Hence instead of 
assuming fixed values either on DSM cost or electricity price (i.e., DSM benefit), we used a 
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 ratio letting both DSM cost and electricity price to vary. Moreover, the use of the ratio 
ensures the results of study are not-sensitive to approaches (i.e., economic or financial) used 
in the partial equilibrium analysis. This is because, if the DSM cost (i.e., the numerator used 
for the calculation of the ratio) is a commercial or financial cost, electricity tariff is used in 
the denominator. On other hand, if the DSM cost is an economic cost, the electricity tariff is 
replaced with the economic cost of electricity supply. Use of ratio helps the study to have 
generic results otherwise the results are subject to assumptions on DSM costs and electricity 
prices.  
 
2.2.3. Household income 
Total household income (THI) consists of capital income, labor income, and net 
transfer from the rest of the world. Capital income also includes depreciation. Labor income 
consists of not only salary and wages but also social security benefits to households. Total 
household income is then expressed as: 






i + + + + + + =∑ )] 1 .( . ) 1 .( . [ τ τ    (23) 
where wr and kpi are the gross tax prices of labor and capital, respectively. NTRH is the net 
transfer from the rest of the world to households and is expressed as a constant fraction of 
total exports. DSMSAV is net household savings due to the DSM program and CDMREV is 
revenue generated from the sales of GHG mitigation as certified emissions reduction (CER) 
units (hereafter the ‘CDM revenue’) and Equation 22 is modified as: 
 
The CDM revenue (CDMREV) is calculated as follows: 
CDMREV adf cerp TPOL TPOL CO CO =× × − ( 2
0
2)
                                                          
       ( 2 4 )  
where adf is the fraction of total CDM revenue that is required to cover administrative costs 
and adaptation fees
10. The price of CER is represented by ‘cerp’, and TPOL
0
CO2 and 
TPOLCO2 are emissions of carbon dioxide (measured in tons of carbon) in the base and policy 
simulation cases, respectively.  
 
10   Article 12.8 of the Kyoto Protocol states that a share of the proceeds from certified project activities is used to 
cover administrative expenses as well as to assist developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate change, to meet their costs of adaptation (UNFCCC, 1998). 
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Considering the wide range of transaction activities under the CDM project cycle 
(e.g., project validation, registration and monitoring; and credit verification and certification), 
25% of the total CER revenue derived from the DSM program is allocated to cover 
transaction costs. Besides, we also carry out sensitivity analyses later, at various levels of 
transaction costs (e.g., 10%, 20% and 30% of the total CER revenue). The price of carbon 
credits is another key factor in determining the economic impacts of a CDM project activity. 
In 2006, CERs were traded in the secondary markets at a price range between US$14/tCO2 
and US$20/tCO2 (Capoor and Ambrosi, 2007). Instead of setting a price for CERs, our model 
simulates the DSM program for a price range from zero to US$50/tCO2.  
 
Total income tax paid by the household (ITAX) is given by: 





L =+ ∑(. . ..) ττ
i )
         ( 2 5 )  
We assume here that households do not pay tax on income generated from net transfer from 
rest of world to households and CDM revenue. Total household income (I) corresponds to 
disposable income and the imputed value of leisure, and is given as: 
I THI ITAX LS wr =− + .             ( 2 6 )  
 
2.3. The government sector 
 
Total government revenue (GI) consists of indirect taxes paid by firms, direct taxes 
paid by households, import duties, and net transfers from the rest of the world (NTRG). GI is 
allocated to government expenditure (GCE) and government savings (SAVG). 
GI G gp indt M mp impt ITAX NTRG i
i
ii i i i =+ + + ∑ .. . .       ( 2 7 )  
SAVG GI CG gp indt i
i
i =− + ∑ ** ( 1          ( 2 8 )  
where Gi and Mi are demand for the composite good and imported good respectively, and gpi 
and mpi are the corresponding prices; indti and impti are indirect tax and import duty rates, 
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 respectively. Government consumption of good i (CGi) is kept constant at the same level as 
in the base case
11. 
 
2.4. The foreign sector 
 
2.4.1. Import demand  
Following Armington (1969), we assume domestically produced and imported goods 
to be imperfect substitutes. The total domestic demand for a good or a service (G) is assumed 
to be a CES composite of domestically produced (G
D) and imported components (G
M). It can 
be expressed as: 
























/ ( )/ / ( )/ /( ) αα
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i. The dual function of Equation (22) is used to derive gpi: 









− −− [{ . . ( ) }
() () / ( αα
σ σσ 1 11 1 1 ] )     (30) 
where gpwi is the world price of good i, and ER is the exchange rate. Both of them are 
exogenous to the model. 
 
2.4.2. Export demand 







i = α ε (
.
)            ( 3 1 )  
where αi
EX is the share of good i in total export demand and εi is the price elasticity of 
exported good i with respect to the world price of the same good
12. Similar to a number of 
existing general equilibrium models such as Dervis et al (1982) and Benjamin (1994) the 
nominal exchange rate is kept fixed; domestic prices fluctuate against the fixed foreign price 
level, which serves as the price numéraire in the model. 
                                                           
11 Similar approach also adopted in most existing general equilibrium models (e.g., Xie 1996 and Zhang 1997). 
12   Similar approach is followed by a number of existing studies such as Dervis et al. (1982), Proost and van 
Rogermorter (1992) and Naqvi (1999) to model export demand. 
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2.4.3. Current balance 
The current balance (TBAL) refers to the difference between total value outflow (e.g., 
imports of goods and services) from the country to the total value inflow (e.g., exports and 
transfers from the rest of the world) to the country.  
TBAL M mp EX ep NTRH NTRG jj j
j
j =− − − ∑ [ . . ]        ( 3 2 )  
 
2.5. Investment demand  
 
The model assumes that the total current investment in an economy is equal to the 
total capital goods delivered to the economy in the previous year (Capros et al. 1997). 














). ( )( )
1
11
τ σ ]        ( 3 3 )  
where, invpi is price of investment in sector i; ‘ir’, ‘dpr’ and ‘gr’ are interest rate, 
depreciation rate and growth rate of sectoral production, respectively. Although the rate of 
depreciation and production growth rates can vary across the sectors, the model assumes 
them the same for all the sectors. Delivery of investment good i (INVDi) is assumed to be a 
fixed share of total investment goods delivered to the economy.  




= ∑ .           ( 3 4 )  
where, ai
INV is the share of investment demanded by sector i in total investment demand.   
 
2.6. Market clearing 
 
Total production of good i is the sum of the domestic consumption of domestically 
produced good and exported good. 
XD G EX ii
D
i =+            ( 3 5 )  
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 Total domestic demand (G) consists of intermediate (ZA) and final demand (i.e., household 
consumption CH, government consumption CG, capital goods INVD, and inventory goods 
STK).  
GZ AC HC GI N V DS T K iiii i =+++ i +        ( 3 6 )  
Inventory demand for good i (STKi) is maintained as a fixed fraction of output from sector i 
before and after the carbon tax. 
 
  It is assumed that the total time endowment (i.e., the active population) in the economy 
does not change due a policy change. This assumption implies that the total labor supply to 
the economy depends on the wage rate and labor supply elasticity. Following the Walrasian 
approach it is assumed that the total labor supply (TLS) in the economy is equal to the total 







            ( 3 7 )  
where TTE is the total time endowment, ξ is the ratio of total hours to working hours, either 
on a daily basis or a weekly basis. The model allows capital mobility across the production 
sectors. However, the total capital stock in the economy (TK) is assumed to be unchanged as 
a result of a policy change.  
 
2.7 Emission estimation 
 
Emissions of a pollutant p from sector n (POLn,p) (p = CO2, SO2 and NOx) can be 
estimated as follows: 
POL FF c ef np fn f fp
f
,, .. = ∑ ,            ( 3 8 )  
where n represents 20 industrial sectors (except the electricity sector), the household sector 
and the government sector; FFf,n refers to use of fossil fuel f (in monetary unit) in sector n; cf, 
converts FFf to energy unit (e.g., Giga Joule, GJ) and can be expressed as GJ/Baht; and eff,p 
is the emission factor of pollutant p for fuel f, expressed in kg of pollutant per GJ unit fuel 
consumption. Emissions from the electricity sub-sectors are also calculated in a similar 
manner.  
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The main data needed for the study includes a social accounting matrix (SAM) of 
Thailand and elasticity parameters as implied by Figure 1 to Figure 3. The SAM was taken 
from Timilsina and Shrestha (2002) and elasticity values were taken from Timilsina and 
Shrestha (2006).  
 
3. RESULTS FROM MODEL SIMULATIONS  
 
3.1. Impacts on economic welfare 
 
Welfare impacts of the DSM program are presented in Figures 4(a) to 4(c). In each 
figure, the curve designated by “No CDM” represents welfare effects of the DSM program in 
the absence of the CDM, whereas the other curves represent the welfare effects of the DSM 
program under the CDM with varying CER prices. Figure 4(a) assumes that the unit cost of 
electricity savings is 40% of the price of electricity (i.e., CPR =0.4). Figure 4(b) and 4(c) 
assume CPR to be equal to 0.6 and 1.0, respectively.   
 































































   (a)  η  =  0.4        (b)  η = 0.6 
 



































(c) η = 1.0 
 
The figures illustrate quantitatively how the welfare impacts of the DSM program 
change with: (i) the rate of substitution of less efficient appliances with their more efficient 
counterparts, (ii) the ratio of unit cost of electricity savings to electricity price and (iii) the 
price of CERs. For a given value of CPR and CER price, the welfare impacts decrease with 
the rate of substitution as the marginal cost of energy efficiency improvements is increasing. 
If CPR equals 0.4, the welfare impacts of the DSM program would be slightly positive when 
the rate of substitution is 10% even if the DSM program is implemented in the absence of 
CDM. A 10% substitution of inefficient electrical appliances in the household sector results 
in approximately 0.91% reductions of national CO2 emissions per year. If the rate of 
substitution is increased to 20%, the DSM program would reduce approximately 1.63% of 
national CO2 emissions per year. This would, however, cause a welfare loss, even if CPR 
equals 0.4, unless the DSM program is implemented under the CDM and CERs are sold at a 
price greater than US$10/tCO2. Similarly, if CPR increases to 0.6, CDM revenues would be 
required to have a positive welfare effect even at 10% substitution rate. This result implies 
that the ratio of unit cost of electricity savings to price of electricity is highly critical to 
economy wide effects of a DSM program. 
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 The study finally demonstrates how the welfare impacts of a DSM program improve 
if the DSM program is implemented under the CDM. For example, for 0.4 CPR and 20% rate 
of substitution, the welfare impact of the DSM program would be -.036% in the absence of 
the CDM; it would increase to 0.018% if the program is implemented under the CDM and 
CER price is 25/tCO2 (see Figure 4a). This is because an implementation of the DSM 
program significantly enhances its profitability. We find that the IRR of the DSM program 
increases from 13% to 26% if CER price increases from zero to US$50/tCO2 when CPR is 
0.6. At a lower value of CPR (0.4), the IRR increases from 24% to 41% when CER price 
increases from zero to US$50/tCO2. Even if CPR equals 1 (i.e., net savings from the DSM 
program is zero), a CER price of US40/tCO2 could cause positive welfare impacts as long as 
the rate of substitution is below 10%. Thus, CDM could play an instrumental role in 
enhancing the attractiveness of DSM programs in Thailand as it helps improve the welfare 
impacts of the programs. Moreover, CDM would not only improve economic attractiveness 
of a DSM program, it could also help reduce deliverable barriers to DSM programs (e.g., 
financial barriers). Dealing with deliverable barriers is crucial in Thailand because only a 
limited number of DSM projects have been implemented in the country despite being highly 
attractive economically (IRR > 25%) (du Pont, 2005). 
 
Unless the ratio of unit cost of electricity savings to the price of electricity is 
sufficiently low (or IRR of the DSM programs is sufficiently high, greater than 23% in the 
case of Thailand), the DSM program might lead to negative welfare impacts from a general 
equilibrium perspective. This is because the replacement of inefficient appliances with 
efficient appliances would cause an increased demand for electrical appliances services and 
reduce the demand for electricity. To meet the increased demand for appliances, their 
production (i.e., gross output) and imports would increase. The increase in the production of 
electrical appliances would mean an increase in the production and imports of those goods 
used in the electrical appliances industry. On the other hand, as demand for electricity 
decreases, electricity generation together with demand for fuels and materials used for 
electricity generation also decrease. Since the increase in sectoral outputs of the electrical 
appliance industry and of those industries supplying goods to the electrical appliance industry 
is higher than the reduction in sectoral outputs of the electricity and fuel sectors, there would 
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 be a net increase in total gross output of the economy. The increase in the total gross output 
is also accompanied by higher labor demand as well as higher labor supply in equilibrium. 
An increase in labor supply implies a decrease in leisure as a household’s total time 
endowment is fixed. There would also be reductions in factor prices in equilibrium. The 
reductions in factor prices and leisure would result in the reduction in full income of 
households, which in turn causes a reduction in welfare. For lower values of CPR and higher 
CER prices, the positive feedback impacts from fuel savings and CDM revenue would be 
greater than the negative feedback impacts of the DSM program, thereby resulting in positive 
welfare impacts. 
 
3.2. Environmental impacts  
 
Table 2 presents the impacts of the DSM program on emissions of CO2, SO2 and 
NOx. As can be seen from the table, percentage reductions in emissions would increase with 
the rate of replacement of inefficient electrical appliances with efficient ones. On the other 
hand, the price of CER and the ratio of unit cost of electricity savings to electricity price do 
not have noticeable impacts on emission reductions.  
 
One interesting finding is that the DSM program would reduce SO2 emissions at a 
higher proportion than CO2 emissions. If the value of local air pollutants are also accounted 
for, the welfare impacts of the DSM program would be higher than that we report in this 
study. 
 
Combining the welfare and environmental impacts yields some interesting insights. 
The household sector DSM program considered here would result in positive welfare impacts 
even in the absence of CDM while reducing national level CO2, SO2 and NOx annual 
emissions by 0.91% 1.31% and 0.64%, respectively, as long as the unit cost of electricity 
savings to electricity price is smaller than 0.4 (i.e., IRR > 23%). At 0.4 CPR, a CDM scheme 
with a CER price greater than US$10/tCO2 would increase CO2, SO2 and NOx reductions to 
1.6%, 2.4% and 1.2% while maintaining the positive welfare effects; if the price of CER is 
greater than US$25/tCO2, the corresponding emissions reductions would be 2.8% 3.9% and 
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 2.0%. The CDM registration would be more instrumental when the DSM program is not 
economically attractive otherwise. If the DSM program has a CPR greater than 0.6 (IRR < 
12%) and is implemented in the absence of the CDM, it would reduce economic welfare by 
0.02% to achieve the same level of emission reductions when CPR was 0.4. The welfare loss 
would be offset if the DSM program is implemented under the CDM and CERs are sold at a 
price slightly greater than US$10/tCO2; welfare improvement would be 0.01% if CERs are 
sold at US$25/tCO2. The CDM with CER price US$25/tCO2 would reduce CO2, SO2 and 
NOx emissions by 1.6%, 2.4% and 1.2% without reducing welfare even if the DSM program 
has CPR 0.6. 
 
Table 2: Impacts of DSM Program on Total CO2, SO2 and NOx Emissions  
(% change from the base case) 
   Rate of replacement of inefficient appliances with efficient counterparts 
  CPR = 0.4  CPR = 0.6 
    10% 20% 40% 80% 10% 20% 40% 80%
  CO2 Emission                         
NO  CDM  -0.90 -1.63 -2.75 -4.18 -0.90 -1.63 -2.74 -4.17
US$5/tCO2  -0.90 -1.63 -2.75 -4.18 -0.90 -1.63 -2.74 -4.17
US$10/tCO2  -0.90 -0.90 -0.90 -0.90 -0.90 -0.90 -0.90 -0.90
US$25/tCO2  -0.91 -1.64 -2.76 -4.20 -0.90 -1.64 -2.75 -4.19
US$50/tCO2  -0.91 -1.65 -2.77 -4.22 -0.91 -1.64 -2.77 -4.21
  SO2  E m i s s i o n           
NO  CDM  -1.31 -2.34 -3.87 -5.72 -1.30 -2.33 -3.86 -5.70
US$5/tCO2  -1.31 -2.34 -3.88 -5.72 -1.30 -2.34 -3.86 -5.71
US$10/tCO2  -1.31 -1.31 -1.31 -1.31 -1.30 -1.30 -1.30 -1.30
US$25/tCO2  -1.31 -2.36 -3.90 -5.75 -1.31 -2.35 -3.88 -5.73
US$50/tCO2  -1.32 -2.37 -3.92 -5.79 -1.32 -2.36 -3.91 -5.77
  NOx Emission                         
NO  CDM  -0.64 -1.17 -2.01 -3.17 -0.64 -1.16 -2.00 -3.16
US$5/tCO2  -0.64 -1.17 -2.01 -3.17 -0.64 -1.17 -2.01 -3.17
US$10/tCO2  -0.64 -0.64 -0.64 -0.64 -0.64 -0.64 -0.64 -0.64
US$25/tCO2  -0.64 -1.17 -2.02 -3.18 -0.64 -1.17 -2.01 -3.18
US$50/tCO2  -0.64 -1.18 -2.02 -3.20 -0.64 -1.17 -2.02 -3.19
 
 
Although reductions of SO2 and NOx have been calculated in the analysis, the 
monetary values of these pollutants have not been incorporated in welfare impacts. If 
included, the economic welfare of the DSM programs would be higher than those reported 
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 here. Moreover, impacts of the DSM program on fine particulate matters (e.g., PM10, PM2.5) 
have not included in the study. Reduction of the fine particulate matters can be perceived as 
an important side benefit of a DSM program particularly in country like Thailand, where 
lignite (i.e., brown coal) is one of the primary sources of electricity generation. If the benefits 
of fine particulate reduction are also accounted for, the welfare of DSM program would be 
further higher. Further analysis including monetary benefits of SOx, NOx and PM10 could be 
an interesting future extension of the study.  
 
3.3 Sensitivity analysis 
 
The sensitivity analyses focus on the elasticity of substitution parameters for the 
household sector as the demand side CDM option considered here corresponds to the 
household sector. Moreover, we also carry out the sensitivity analysis using an alternative 
functional form (i.e., CES) to combine electricity and electrical appliances, to derive 
household electrical services. The sensitivity analyses on parameter values under the demand 
side CDM option focus on the following elasticities of substitution in the household sector: 
(i)  present consumption and savings (σ
FCS)  




(iii)the fuel aggregate and electricity service (σ
HDFEL). 
 
The changes in emission mitigation and welfare loss due to the changes in elasticity of 
substitutions are found to be very small  
 
In the main analysis, we represent the households’ trade off between electricity and 
electrical appliances by using a Cobb-Douglas functional form (see Equation 14). We now 
replace the Cobb-Douglas functional form by a CES functional form (See Equation 16). We 
consider different values of elasticity of substitution between electricity and electrical 
                                                           
13 Electrical service here represents composite of electricity and electrical appliances, while aggregate material 
represents the composite of all material goods used in the households except electrical appliances. 
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 appliances. These values are smaller than 1 (i.e., considered in the main analysis under the 
Cobb-Douglas specification). As expected, for all levels of CER prices considered (i.e., from 
0 to US$50/tCO2) and at each rate of substitution of inefficient electrical appliances by their 
efficient counterparts (i.e., from 10% to 80%), the welfare cost of the DSM program is found 
to increase as the value of the elasticity of substitution between electricity and electrical 
appliances is decreased. However, the changes in welfare impacts as well emission 
reductions are not significant unless the values of elasticity of substitution are lowered by 
50%.  
 
4. CONCLUSIONS  
 
We examine, using a CGE model, the welfare effects of a potential DSM program 
that can replace inefficient electrical appliances with their efficient counterparts in the 
household sector in Thailand. Our study shows empirically that the welfare impact of a DSM 
program depends on three key factors: (i) the ratio of unit cost of electricity savings to 
electricity price, (ii) CER price and (iii) the rate of substitution of less efficient appliances 
with their efficient counterparts (or volume of emission reductions). Although the existing 
literature, such as Dufournaud et al. (1994) and Rose and Lin (1995), argue that a DSM 
program would lead to negative welfare implications, we find that not all DSM programs 
cause a welfare loss. In this study, we find that the DSM program would increase economic 
welfare if the ratio of unit cost of electricity savings to price of electricity (CPR) is 0.4 or 
lower even in the absence of CDM. If the DSM programs are implemented under the CDM, 
welfare effects would improve further. The CDM registration of DSM projects would also 
increase the volume of GHG mitigation along with price of CERs while achieving a given 
level of welfare impacts. The welfare function considered in the study does not account for 
benefits of local air pollution reductions; if these benefits are included, welfare impacts 
would be higher than that found in this study.  
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